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SÍNTESE – Pode o conhecimento de uma dada
verdade admitir gradações? Sim, de fato, segun-
do o gradualismo deste artigo. O artigo introduz o
conceito do saber-como que p – isto é, o conceito 
de saber como é que p. Saber-como que p é 
claramente gradual – admitindo gradações, dado 
que se pode saber mais ou menos como é que p. 
E a vinculação que este artigo faz entre saber-
como que p e saber que p revela que este último
tipo de conhecimento também é gradual (mesmo
que disfarçadamente). A teoria dos criadores-de-
verdade [truthmakers] é, então, invocada para
enriquecer a análise, e a análise é aplicada às
tarefas de fazer sentido do fundacionismo e de
barrar uma certa forma de ceticismo. 
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ABSTRACT – Can knowledge of a particular truth 
admit of degrees? Indeed so, according to this 
paper’s gradualism. The paper introduces the 
concept of how-knowledge that p – that is, the 
concept of knowing how it is that p. How-
knowledge that p is clearly gradational –
admitting of degrees, as one can know more or 
less of how it is that p. And this paper’s linking of 
how-knowledge that p with knowledge that p
reveals the latter kind of knowledge, too, to be 
gradational (even if covertly so). Truthmaker 
theory is then called upon to enrich the analysis,
and the analysis is applied to the tasks of 
understanding foundationalism and of thwarting 
one form of scepticism. 
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This paper argues that we should accept a gradualism about knowledge that 
p – propositional knowledge. That sort of gradualism rejects knowledge-
absolutism, a thesis that has long been taken for granted within many epistemo-
logical debates.
1 Even statements – let alone endorsements – of knowledge-
gradualism are almost entirely absent from epistemology.
2 I will therefore allow my 
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1
   For how long has that thesis helped to shape epistemology? Elsewhere (2006b), I argue that it 
seems to have been bequeathed by Descartes’s eminently optional yet historically influential   
methodology. 
2
   In Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge (2001), I present a detailed gradualism about propositional 
knowledge – a less generic knowledge-gradualism than this paper’s. Unlike the knowledge-
gradualism in that earlier book, this new version will not be framed in terms of whatever strength of   130
paper’s knowledge-gradualism to take shape slowly, in accord with the sustained 
construction of the argument against knowledge-absolutism. I will be describing 
an aspect of knowledge that has been largely overlooked, along with some epis-
temological implications of rectifying that oversight. 
1  Introducing knowledge-absolutism 
It is epistemological orthodoxy that propositional knowledge is absolute, in 
the sense of being unable to admit of degrees or grades. Thus, I could never have 
some intermediate degree of knowledge that I have a hand – where this means 
that, at least in principle, tomorrow I could have a better degree of knowledge that 
I have a hand. Justification is gradational (epistemologists concede); knowledge is 
not (they insist). Evidence can be better or worse; knowledge cannot. The reason 
for this (epistemologists will say) is that knowledge is a threshold phenomenon. 
That is, once there is sufficient justification to make a true belief that p knowl-
edge, any further justification supporting that belief improves one’s overall epis-
temic situation as regards p – but without literally improving one’s knowledge  
that p. 
Yet none of that is really an argument for knowledge-absolutism. It is a state-
ment of what knowledge is like if knowledge-absolutism is true. It articulates 
knowledge-absolutism’s being true; it does not try to understand what knowledge 
would be like if knowledge-absolutism were not true. The standard acceptance of 
knowledge-absolutism remains, for most epistemologists, an unshakeable assump-
tion.
3 But must it be accepted at all, let alone so confidently? The next several 
sections argue directly against it. The result is a non-standard conception of kno-
wledge – as subsequent sections will make clear, by applying it to a few tradi-
tional epistemological issues. 
2  How-knowledge that p and non-absolutism 
My argument begins with the following question: Do I know how it is that I 
have two hands?
4 Do I have that particular instance of how-knowledge (as we 
might call it)? If I do, this can occur in different ways and to different extents. 
After all, it is obvious that I do not know everything that happens to constitute my 
having hands. That is, I do not know fully or completely or exhaustively how it is 
that I have hands, because I do not know all of the constitutive aspects of my 
                             
justification is present within a given piece of knowledge. (It is possible that further argument could 
discover that this paper’s generic gradualism would be most fruitfully instantiated by something 
like the earlier version. I will not determine that here.) 
3
   Few epistemologists have striven to argue for it. In (2001: 13-18), I discuss attempts by Ryle and by 
Dretske. Section 14 considers another way in which epistemologists might attempt to establish 
knowledge-absolutism. 
4
   This should not be confused with knowing how to do something, the latter being the distinctively 
Rylean (1949: ch. 2) sense of knowing how. On links between knowledge-that and knowing-how-
to, see my (2006a).   131
having hands. I do not know in its constitutive entirety whatever it is that amounts 
to my having those hands. I do not know all of what it takes for me to have hands 
– all that there is to my having them. In short, I do not know fully how it is that  
I have hands. 
Do I therefore lack knowledge of how it is that I have hands? I do not know 
many details of how the tendons, veins, and so on, are arranged or how they func-
tion within my hands. It is true that I am ignorant of those aspects of whatever it is 
that constitutes the entirety of my having these hands. Am I ignorant of too many 
such aspects? 
That is the question – when generalised – of whether we should be sceptics 
about how-knowledge. In reply, we should concede that even at best I possess less-
than-exhaustive knowledge of how it is that I have hands. This might not be a fail-
ing, though. There is a real possibility that all how-knowledge is less-than-
exhaustive, given the normal conceptual and computational finitude among people 
in general. And (unless scepticism is accepted independently) we are not obliged to 
infer from this that there is no how-knowledge. 
What we should infer is a non-absolutism about any how-knowledge of ours. 
That is, instances of how-knowledge admit of degrees or grades. I can know more 
or less fully, in more or less detail, how it is that I have hands – thereby having a 
congruent degree or grade of knowledge of how it is that I have hands. Even if it is 
impossible to know exhaustively how it is that I have hands,
5 there are various lesser 
reaches which such knowledge might have. 
Here is one potential explication of the basic idea behind that suggested non-
absolutism about how-knowledge: 
Hk At  time  t, a person x’s how-knowledge that p is more, or it is less, well devel-
oped or extensive, in accord with however many aspects of how it is that p 
which are known by x at t.
6 
Manifestly, that p obtains is one of those aspects of how it is that p; it is a minimal 
aspect. But in practise it is usual for people to know many further aspects, too, of 
how it is that p – whenever, of course, they have the how-knowledge that p at all. 
Standardly, whatever how-knowledge is present in practise is better developed or 
extensive than in principle it might have been. The extent to which a particular 
piece of how-knowledge is developed may (roughly speaking) be regarded as a 
measure of the epistemic richness or depth of that how-knowledge. 
                             
5
   I am not committing myself to exhaustive how-knowledge’s never being available (although section 
9 will take that possibility seriously). If there is little structural complexity in how it is that p (for a 
particular p), maybe there can be exhaustive knowledge of how it is that p. 
6
   Here are two possible variations on this initial suggestion (neither of which I will develop in this 
paper). (1) Chuck Cross suggested to me that one instance, k1, of how-knowledge that p is more 
extensive than a second one, k 2, if the set of aspects of how it is that p which k1 encompasses 
properly includes the set of aspects of how it is that p which k2 encompasses. On this variation (as 
Cross acknowledged, approvingly), not all instances of how-knowledge that p possess comparable 
degrees of extensiveness – because the described relationship of proper inclusion is not always 
present. (2) We might incorporate within Hk a weighting for the centrality, to how it is that p, of the 
various known aspects of how it is that p. Would this weighting be pragmatic?   132
3  Knowledge that p entails how-knowledge that p 
Section 2 has conveyed some sense of the structure of any case of how-
knowledge.
7 Now let us turn to the relationship between how-knowledge that p and 
knowledge that p. I believe that →H is true: 
→H Knowing  that  p entails having how-knowledge that p. More fully: At time t, if a 
person x knows that p, then at t x has how-knowledge that p (where this how-
knowledge has some  degree d  of development or extensiveness). For short:   
K(p) → (∃d)dKH(p). 
→H allows for your having a comparatively superficial case of knowledge that 
p – where that superficiality is epistemic. You would know only superficially how 
it is that p. This would be your knowing less extensively how it is that p – less 
extensively than is realistically and normally possible. More formally: You would 
know that p, without knowing that q – for many instances of q (where q is an 
aspect of how it is that p). 
The same is true, mutatis mutandis, of your having an epistemically deeper in-
stance of knowledge that p. You would know more deeply how it is that p. This 
would be your knowing more extensively how it is that p – more extensively, per-
haps, than is normal. More formally: There would be fewer instances of q (where q 
is an aspect of how it is that p), such that you know that p without knowing that q. 
For instance (with all else being equal), if I were a surgeon, I would know – as I 
do now – that I have two hands. But in doing so, I would know more fully than I do 
now how it is that I have them. In different respects, the same would be true if I 
were an evolutionary biologist. In each case, I would know more aspects than in fact 
I do of how it is that I have hands. This further knowledge might be part of the re-
spective bodies of evidence I would possess in those cases (as a surgeon or an evo-
lutionary biologist) for the belief that I have hands; then again, it might not. In either 
event, the further knowledge would be present – thereby enriching those imagined 
ways in which I would know that I have hands. I am not saying that (within those 
hypothesised cases) the belief that I have hands would be knowledge in the first 
place only because of the existence of those larger networks of related knowledge.
8 
Nevertheless, in each case that belief is enriched epistemically, as the knowledge it 
is, by its degree of embeddedness within the respective case’s network of pieces of 
knowledge of aspects of how it is that I have hands. The knowledge that I have 
hands is enriched to some more or less specific degree, by being embedded within a 
given – and more or less extensive – network. Each of those actual or hypothetical 
instances of knowledge that I have hands thus includes a degree of development – 
some degree of wider-ranging epistemic embeddedness – in its grasp of how it is 
that I have hands. 
                             
7
   For more on the locution, ‘knows how it is that’, see Franklin (1981: 201-8). 
8
   This paper offers no reductive definitions (in terms of phenomena other than knowledge that p) 
either of knowledge that p or of how-knowledge that p. My main goal is to chart structural links 
between knowledge that p – whatever that is, more precisely (something I leave open) – and how-
knowledge that p. Section 9 presents my most detailed charting of those links.   133
4  How-knowledge that p entails knowledge that p 
The converse entailment to section 3’s core thesis, →H, also obtains: 
H→ ( ∃d)dKH(p) → K(p) 
This says that if one has even some degree of how-knowledge that p, one has 
knowledge that p. No matter whether one’s how-knowledge that p is epistemi-
cally deeper (in section 3’s sense of being more fully or extensively developed), or 
whether it is epistemically shallower (in section 3’s sense of being less fully or 
extensively developed), one thereby knows that p. Trivially, H→ is true because 
(as section 2 observed) a minimal part of how-knowing that p is one’s knowing 
that p. A fortiori, H→ is true of the usual – more substantive, non-minimal – 
cases. 
Thus, if I were a surgeon, I would possess quite epistemically rich or deep – 
significantly more extensive – knowledge of how it is that I have two hands; and 
obviously this how-knowledge would include the knowledge that I have them. 
As it is, I possess epistemically poorer – more superficial, less extensive – 
knowledge of how it is that I have hands. Part of even this how-knowledge, 
though, is my knowing simpliciter that I have hands. The degree of the hypothe-
sised how-knowledge that I have hands (how-knowledge I would have as a 
surgeon) is higher than the degree of my actual how-knowledge that I have 
hands. Nevertheless, in each case I would know that I have hands – as part of 
knowing how it is that I have hands. 
5  Knowledge that p is how-knowledge that p 
Section 3’s  →H and section 4’s H→ may be conjoined to give us this 
equivalence: 
Knowing that p both entails, and is entailed by, having some quality or degree 
of how-knowledge that p. 
Here is a fuller rendering of that equivalence: 
↔H A  person  x’s knowing on a particular occasion that p both entails, and is ntailed 
by, x’s having some quality or degree on that occasion of how-knowledge that 
p. For short: At t, K(p) ↔ At t, (∃d)dKH(p). 
6  Knowledge that p and non-absolutism 
How-knowledge that p is clearly gradational, admitting of degrees. Hence, if 
↔H is true, then knowledge that p has that same structural feature. Each in-
stance of knowledge that p is thereby an instance of how-knowledge – how-
knowing to some or other degree d – that p. 
Today, I have a less well developed or extensive instance of knowledge of 
how it is that h (where h is the proposition that I have two hands). However, 
suppose that I will spend the next ten years studying human anatomy and biol-  134
ogy. In ten years time, I will continue knowing how it is that h – but I will do 
this more fully or extensively, with my store of associated knowledge having 
grown in the meantime. It is clear (via the following reasoning) why that dispar-
ity between the respective degrees or qualities of those two instances of how-
knowledge is a disparity between degrees or qualities of instances of knowledge 
simpliciter: 
(1) Given ↔H, my present knowledge that h is how-knowledge that h. (2) Given ↔H, 
the knowledge that h which I will have in ten years time (after much study of human 
anatomy and biology) will be distinct how-knowledge that h from that which I now 
have. (3) Indeed (given all of that study), my later how-knowledge that h will possess a 
higher quality or degree than does my present how-knowledge that h. (4) So, by that 
same token, my later knowledge that h will possess a higher quality or degree than 
does my present knowledge that h. 
Along such lines, therefore, ↔H implies this: 
dK  The quality or degree of a person x’s how-knowledge at time t that p is the 
quality or degree of x’s knowledge at t that p. 
From ↔H, x’s knowledge at t that p amounts to x’s how-knowledge at t that p. 
The quality or degree of the latter is thereby the quality or degree of the former – 
as dK says. Thus, we gain a non-absolutism about knowledge that p. 
Is that non-absolutism epistemologically threatening? I do not believe so. 
As is standardly acknowledged, many – maybe all – other kinds of knowledge 
are avowedly non-absolutist. For example, we recognise that there may be 
stronger or weaker knowledge of an object or a person or a topic. We are relaxed 
about the fact that there can be more or less well developed knowledge-who, 
knowledge-how, knowledge-why, and so on. Now we discover knowledge-that’s 
being no different in this respect. That result should be welcomed, as constitut-
ing a step towards increased epistemological unification and greater theoretical 
simplicity. It is a result worth having, if indeed we may have it.
9 
                             
9
   Is it unprecedented? Sometimes contextualism is said to be a non-absolutist thesis. But it is not 
endorsing the sort of non-absolutism articulated via dK in section 6. Or, equivalently,  dK is not a 
contextualist thesis, as contextualism is generally developed. Contextualists claim that attributions 
or denials of knowledge are true or false, relative to epistemic standards that can vary from one oc-
casion of attribution or denial to another. However, contextualists require a constant underlying e-
pistemic standard to be applied within each such context – the standard of all relevant or salient 
alternatives or possibilities being eliminated. And that standard is absolutist. It does not allow that 
there could be intermediate and differing degrees of knowledge that p within a context – due to in-
termediate and differing numbers of alternatives being eliminated there, say. Lewis (1996: 562-3) is 
the only contextualist, I believe, who has embraced non-absolutism. (My account also differs from 
contextualism in not being first and foremost a semantic theory.)   135
7  Degrees of knowledge and degrees of belief
10 
Let us now reflect upon degrees of belief. Here are two structural possibilities 
for how we might seek to understand that phenomenon: 
db1  A person can have some degree of belief that p without having a belief sim- 
pliciter that p. 
db2  o have even some degree of belief that p is to believe simpliciter that p. 
On db1, someone can have a prior and partial degree of belief that p – where 
this falls short of having a ‘full’ belief that p. Only a sufficiently high degree of 
belief would be a full belief – in effect, an actual belief. Only in that way would a 
belief as such be constituted. But in that respect db1 and db2 are significantly 
different. On db2, having a degree of belief that p is not constitutively prior to 
having a belief per se that p; rather, it is a way for the latter – a belief that p as 
such – to be present. Thus, on db2, within the category of belief simpliciter 
there can be gradations. There could be more or less intense and committed 
instances, say, of a belief that p, with these constituting stronger or weaker 
degrees of belief that p. Nonetheless, each instance would – in its own way – be 
a belief that p. 
And db2 corresponds to my intended picture of the constitutive relationship 
between knowledge and how-knowledge. Analogously to db1 and db2, these 
two possible theses arise: 
dk1  A person can have some degree of how-knowledge that p without having 
knowledge simpliciter that p. 
dk2  To have even some degree of how-knowledge that p is to know simpliciter that 
p. 
On dk1, someone can have a prior and partial degree of how-knowledge that p – 
where this falls short of having a ‘full’ instance of knowledge that p. Only a suffi-
ciently high degree of how-knowledge would be a full instance of knowledge that 
p – in effect, an actual case of knowledge that p. Only in that way would a piece 
of knowledge be constituted. But in that respect dk1 and dk2 are significantly 
different. On dk2, having a degree of how-knowledge that p is not constitutively 
prior to having a case of knowledge per se that p; rather, it is a way for the latter 
to be present. Thus, on dk2, within the category of knowledge simpliciter that p 
there can be gradations – with instances of how-knowledge that p being more or 
less extensive, while remaining instances of knowledge that p. 
Yet of what, more precisely, are these gradations constituted? Sections 2 
through 6 have described a dimension along which these gradations can be mani-
fested. Unlike the dimension most obviously alluded to by db2, the dimension 
underlying dk2 is not one of psychological commitment or intensity. It is purely 
epistemic. It might thereby be justificatory; then again, it might not be – a possi-
                             
10
   This section owes much to observations and questions by Chuck Cross.   136
bility to which I will return in section 9.
11 So far, this paper has allowed for both of 
those alternatives by describing the epistemic dimension in question simply as 
involving – generically – further knowledge. My proposal reminds us that, in 
knowing that p, one is likely to be knowing more than the unadorned truth that p. 
One knows more, or one knows less, of how it is that p: one has a more, or a less, 
extensive instance of how-knowledge that p. Correlatively, one knows that p with 
an associated epistemic depth or extensiveness. Each instance of knowledge that 
p embodies some epistemic way in which the truth that p is known. And there 
can be different such ways, more or less epistemically deep or extensive ways. 
These characterise the respective instances of knowledge that p. How one knows 
that p, on a given occasion, is in part the extent to which one knows how it is 
that p. This is an extent to which one has taken, or extended, one’s knowledge 
that p. 
As things stand, for example, I know that I have two hands. I do so in such a 
way as to possess some degree d of how-knowledge that I have hands, knowing 
as I do various aspects of how it is that I have them. But if, instead, I were to 
possess a surgeon’s form of knowledge that I have hands, then I would probably 
possess this knowledge in such a way as to have some degree d+ of how-
knowledge that I have hands – where d+ > d. Other things being equal, I would 
know more aspects of how it is that I have hands. There is, it seems, this roughly 
measurable difference between these ways for me to know the truth of my having 
hands.
12 
8  How-knowledge that p and truthmakers 
We have found knowledge that p to be how-knowledge that p – which is 
knowledge of various aspects of how it is that p. Presumably, therefore, to have 
how-knowledge that p is to have knowledge of various aspects of a truth – that-
p.
13 Which aspects, though? Truthmaker theory can help us here. I will focus on 
Armstrong’s (2004) recent version of truthmaker theory.
14 
                             
11
   My (2001) explicates this epistemic dimension in justificatory terms. There, I propose that an in-
stance of knowledge that p is better or worse as knowledge that p, in accord with the strength of 
whatever justification (if any) it includes. Note 2 explained how this paper’s account is more gen-
eral than that – not relying upon knowledge’s having to include justification at all. (And see note 18 
below.) 
12
   It might seem that I am arguing for knowledge that p’s being a kind of understanding. I would 
indeed welcome that development of my theory, but I am not relying upon it. Presumably, the idea 
is that any how-knowledge that p – and hence, given ↔H, each associated instance of knowledge 
that p – is an instance of more or less extensive understanding of how it is that p. Few epistemolo-
gists discuss understanding. Two exceptions are Zagzebski (2001) and Elgin (2006) – who believe 
that knowledge is quite different from understanding. The proposed development of my theory 
would disagree with them about that. 
13
   This does not entail that the knowledge that p would be knowledge that some particular sentence 
or proposition, say, is true. Knowledge that p could be knowledge of a truth without being knowl-
edge that something is true. 
14
   My page references in this section are to Armstrong’s book. For more on the concept of a truth-
maker, see Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002: 31-40).   137
Truthmaker Maximalism (p. 5) says that any truth has a truthmaker. Knowledge 
is routinely taken to be knowledge of a truth. So, knowledge is of something which 
has a truthmaker. Given Truthmaker Necessitarianism (ibid.), that truthmaker is 
something in the world that necessitates that truth’s being true. Now, truthmakers 
can be more or less discerning (p. 18). The world as a whole is the least discerning 
truthmaker of all, and one’s knowing that p is rarely one’s knowing the world as a 
whole. Consider, though, the concept of a minimal truthmaker (pp. 19-21). If a truth-
maker for a truth that p is minimal, then to ‘subtract’ (p. 19) some part of it is to be 
left with something that does not make it true that p. A minimal truthmaker for the 
truth that Smith is male, for example, is Smith’s being male. But there are many fur-
ther aspects to, or parts of, Smith’s being male. Armstrong would say that it is com-
posed (non-mereologically) of a universal – namely, the property of being male – and 
a particular – namely, Smith. Armstrong would then expect science to reveal the 
underlying natures of those parts of the world. Physical constituents, biological func-
tions, nomically constitutive tendencies, and so on, would be uncovered. (Maybe 
there would be more, such as socially constituted normative aspects to being male.) 
In any case, section 2’s guiding description, Hk, of how-knowledge can be 
parsed somewhat more precisely, in terms of truthmakers: 
HkTm At  time  t, a person x’s how-knowledge that p is more, or it is less, well de-
veloped or extensive, in accord with how many parts of a minimal truth-
maker for p are known by x at t.
15 
Here are a few clarificatory details about HkTm. 
(i) In knowing parts of a minimal truthmaker for p, one can be knowing what 
are also minimal truthmakers for other truths. (Smith’s being male is a minimal 
truthmaker for the truth that Smith is male – while being only a proper part of a 
minimal truthmaker for the truth that Smith is male and a philosopher.) Thus, com-
ponents of an instance of how-knowledge can themselves be instances of proposi-
tional knowledge.
16 
(ii) Armstrong accepts (pp. 17-19) that truthmakers can include truthmakers as 
parts, even for the same truth. That is not true of minimal truthmakers. But if H→ 
(and thereby ↔H) is to be true, we need to understand HkTm so that part of a 
minimal truthmaker for p is that minimal truthmaker itself. (Otherwise, how-
knowledge that p will be precluded from including knowledge that p – because the 
latter knowledge would not be knowledge of a minimal truthmaker for p.) This is 
easily done. We need only permit HkTm’s talk of parts to cover both proper and 
                             
15
   I say ‘a minimal truthmaker’, rather than ‘the minimal truthmaker’, because not all truths have only 
one minimal truthmaker (p. 21). For that same reason, HkTm could be formulated so as to allow the 
degree of x’s how-knowledge that p to reflect x’s knowing (parts of) more than one minimal truth-
maker for p. 
16
   In principle, though, not all of them need be. I leave open the possibility of one’s knowledge of how 
it is that p including, for example, knowledge – including non-propositional knowledge – of a non-
propositional individual such as Smith or such as parts of a hand. But this sort of possibility – al-
though it is significant for any integrated theory of forms of knowledge (an ideal mentioned briefly 
at the end of section 6) – plays no role in the rest of this paper.   138
improper parts – while noting that the minimal truthmaker is a part, without being a 
proper part, of itself. (And knowing the minimal truthmaker will not entail knowing 
every other part of it.)
17 
(iii) One possibility worth examining (but which I have not required in HkTm) is 
that how-knowledge that p should include some knowledge of how the aspects of 
how it is that p constitute its being the case that p. Such knowledge might ‘bind’ 
the other pieces of knowledge. There would be more or less well developed knowl-
edge of how p is constituted by, or constructed from, these various aspects. 
9  Knowledge that p and gradualism 
HkTm explicates how-knowledge in terms of minimal truthmakers. Given ↔H 
and  dK, that explication should spawn a related account of knowledge simpliciter. 
So, here is how we might understand the range of possible degrees and qualities of 
knowledge simpliciter in terms of minimal truthmakers:
18 
(1) Base clause 
(i) Degrees. When a person x’s how-knowledge that p is restricted to knowing a 
minimal truthmaker for p, x has minimal knowledge that p: x would have the 
lowest degree of how-knowledge that p – and thereby of knowledge that p. (ii) 
Qualities. When x has minimal knowledge that p, x knows that p in a bare 
way.
19 We might regard this as being the poorest or narrowest possible knowl-
edge that p, because there is nothing less that x could know while still knowing 
that p. 
                             
17
   It might be objected (as follows) that HkTm does not explain how one could know a disjunction, 
say, without knowing either disjunct individually: 
  A truthmaker for a disjunction which is not a truthmaker for one of the disjuncts is not a mini-
mal truthmaker for the disjunction. Consequently, in knowing the disjunction by knowing a 
minimal truthmaker for it, one has to know at least one of the individual disjuncts. 
  But that depends on how a truthmaker’s parts are identified. Recall that, for Armstrong, a minimal 
truthmaker for p is one from which no part can be subtracted, without its ceasing to be a truth-
maker for p. I suggest our restricting the relevant concept of a (proper) part to a conjunctive part. 
Then there can be a minimal truthmaker for a disjunction that is not a minimal truthmaker for one 
of the disjuncts. We may continue regarding one’s knowledge of a disjunction as able to be knowl-
edge of a minimal truthmaker – without its having to include knowledge of a disjunct. (The same is 
true, mutatis mutandis, of knowledge of conditionals, existential generalisations, and so on.) 
18
   The present account differs from my earlier (2001) analysis in utilising truthmaker theory. Another 
difference is the present account’s being non-reductive (as note 8 observed). It allows structurings 
of pieces of knowledge to accomplish what I previously explicated via strengths of justification. 
(This difference will be more apparent in section 12.) That is, in my previous knowledge-
gradualism, the degree or quality of a piece of knowledge was a function of what constituted the 
knowledge ‘from within’ – the strength of its justificatory component. In this paper’s knowledge-
gradualism, the degree or quality of a piece of knowledge that p is a function of the extensiveness 
of the ‘wider’ network of knowledge that constitutes the degree to which the knowledge that p 
how-knows that p. (Compare this form of theory with Foley’s [1996] analysis. Reductively, he sees 
knowledge as being a true belief embedded within a wider array of true beliefs. But he remains ab-
solutist, not noticing the gradualist potential in his account. That potential is present because the 
wider array of true beliefs can be more or less wide.) 
19
   In using the term ‘bare’, I have in mind the metaphysical analogy of a bare particular. One would 
know that p without knowing any further aspects of how it is that p. This is like knowing a particu-
lar without knowing any of its properties.   139
For example, if I learn by rote, from a reliable source, that the earth orbits the sun 
(call this truth e), I know that e. But if I know no further aspects of how it is that e, 
my knowledge that e is the only knowledge I have of how it is that e. So, my 
knowledge that e is correlatively minimal in degree. It is a bare case of knowledge 
that  e. I could not lose any part of that knowledge without losing the entire 
knowledge that e. 
(2) Inductive clause 
(i) Degrees. To the extent that x’s how-knowledge that p includes knowledge of 
further parts of a minimal truthmaker for p, x has knowledge simpliciter that p 
which is correlatively more developed: x has that-much-higher-than-minimal a 
degree of how-knowledge that p – and thereby of knowledge that p. (ii) Quali-
ties. To the extent that x has knowledge that p which is more developed, x has 
correspondingly broader or better or richer knowledge that p. To the extent that 
the knowledge that p is developed, it includes knowledge of more aspects of 
how it is that p. Any of this further knowledge of aspects of how it is that p is 
knowledge which x could lose before knowledge that p would have departed (all 
else being equal). 
Suppose that I begin studying astronomy, and that I start knowing more aspects 
of how it is that e (where again this is the truth that the earth orbits the sun). This 
would improve my knowledge that e: I would be broadening and enriching my 
knowledge that e. I would continue knowing that e; now, though, I would know it 
in a qualitatively different way. Even in knowing that e, I would be knowing more 
than I might have done. Certainly, even in still knowing that e, I would be know-
ing more than I formerly did. We may think of the situation in the following way: I 
could awaken every day for many days – having lost, with each new day, one 
more piece of my recently acquired astronomical knowledge – before returning to 
knowing only barely that e. 
In some such way, a basic non-absolutism about knowledge becomes a 
more detailed gradualism about knowledge. There is a range of possible degrees 
and qualities of knowledge that p. That range has a lower bound – a lowest 
possible degree and quality of knowledge that p. I have not committed myself to 
there being a highest such degree. This is because there could often – maybe 
always – be infinitely many aspects to how it is that p. In such cases, presuma-
bly, complete or maximal knowledge that p is impossible. That would be knowl-
edge of every aspect of how it is that p; and when there are infinitely many of 
those aspects, any occasion of knowing that p leaves some of them unknown. 
On these occasions, p would be known to a degree less than 1. The knowledge 
that p would possess an intermediate quality. I am not saying that in fact there 
are no cases of maximal or complete knowledge that p – instances of knowing 
that p to degree 1. Maybe there are none; maybe there are some. I suspect that 
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10  Gradualism’s central concept 
That suspicion should constrain how we are to understand gradualism’s cen-
tral concept. We should not presume that better knowledge that p is closer to the 
end-point of being complete or maximal knowledge that p. As section 9’s final 
paragraph implies, there might be no such end-point (for most, perhaps all, values 
of ‘p’). This could be so, even in cases where we wish to distinguish better from 
worse knowledge that p. A surgeon examining me knows better than I do that h 
(that is, that I have hands). This is so, even if there are infinitely many aspects of 
how it is that h – which would imply that neither of us could possess complete 
knowledge that h. 
So, we need an alternative explication of the phenomenon of better or worse 
knowledge that p. Here is mine: Knowledge that p is better as knowledge that p 
insofar as it is further from the starting-point of being bare or minimal knowledge 
that p. Correlatively (and roughly), we might endorse something like this: 
One piece of knowledge that p is better than another (all else being equal) when the 
former knows n+1, while the other knows only n, aspects of how it is that p. 
In effect, we are explicating the degree or quality of any instance of knowledge 
that p in terms of how much better it is than it could have been as knowledge that 
p – rather than in terms of how close it is to, or how far short it is of, being what 
would be an ideal way for it to be as knowledge that p. 
This distinction has substantive implications. For example, sceptics describe 
what could be thought of as being ideal – and what would clearly be temptingly 
good – ways in which to know that p. Sceptics do this, en route to claiming that 
people’s beliefs always fall short of those attainments. But the interpretive distinc-
tion introduced just now suggests that sceptics could be framing the debate so as 
to favour their sceptical conclusions from the outset. They conceive of knowing as 
a matter of how well one has done, in terms of canonical progress towards an end-
point. The present section advocates an alternative conception of knowing – as a 
matter of how well one has done, in terms of canonical progress away from a 
beginning-point. One could have made good progress, relative to a beginning-
point – even if one has not made good progress, relative to an end-point (espe-
cially if there is no such end-point). The potential for a sceptical interpretation is 
manifest in the latter model.
20 
11  Can there be minimal knowledge? 
If section 10 is right, then section 9’s concept of bare or minimal knowledge 
plays a vital role within gradualism. It describes the beginning-point, in relation to 
which any instance of knowledge that p is however good it is as knowledge that p 
– by being more or less far from or beyond being minimal knowledge that p. Yet 
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   Section 13 returns to this issue, by providing details of how this conceptual reorientation under-
mines some scepticisms about knowledge.   141
we need to confront the possibility that there cannot be any bare or minimal 
knowledge that p. Is the concept of such knowledge empty, even necessarily so? 
If it is, then section 10’s account of better or worse knowledge that p is also 
empty. Is this a danger? 
We might at first think so. Even to know just that an individual a has a feature F 
could be thought to require knowledge of what, more generally, it is to be F.
21 This 
further knowledge would be of an aspect of how it is that a is F – rather than of how 
it is that a is H (for some contrary property H). Accordingly, there would be better 
developed how-knowledge that a is F. There would be extra how-knowledge that a 
is F, beyond the knowledge merely of the truth that a is F. So, the knowledge that a 
is F which is present would not be bare knowledge that a is F. 
Still, even that further knowledge might not be needed as part of knowing 
that a is F. Imagine not knowing anything about the property F – what it is to be F 
– other than that a has that property. You know that a is F; in doing so, you know 
that F is possessed by a. Suppose that this is your entire knowledge about a and 
about F. On Armstrong’s favoured conception (pp. 47-8) of instantiation, there is 
an (at least) partial identity between a particular instantiating a property and the 
property being instantiated. On this conception, it is possible to know that a is F 
without knowing anything of F beyond its being instantiated by a. You might 
know as little of F as of a; you might have this knowledge of each at the one 
time.
22 I am not arguing that any actual knowledge that a is F is like that – mini-
mal or bare. But could there be some? 
Moreover, the concept of minimal knowledge is one of which at least a little 
intuitive sense can be made. Regardless of whether anyone ever has minimal 
knowledge, it would be knowledge lacking several features we wish most, per-
haps all, of our knowledge to possess. For minimal knowledge that p involves no 
developed understanding of how it is that p. It includes no insights into how it is 
that p. It is unilluminating as to what it is for p to obtain. All of this is so, because 
minimal knowledge that p is unaccompanied by knowledge of any parts of a 
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   Evans would have said so, courtesy of his Generality Constraint (1982: 100-5, 256). (I am grateful to 
Anne Newstead for alerting me to Evans’s views on this.) Thus, in being able to think of a as being 
F, one must be able to think of a as being G, as being H, and so on. Evans also said that one needs 
to be able to think of other individuals – b, c, and so forth – as being F. Nonetheless, even if Evans 
is right about what it is to think that a is F, no analogous constraint applies to knowing that a is F. 
First, knowing that it is true that a is F does not require its being true (let alone its being known to 
be true) that a is G or that a is H, or that b is F or that c is F. Moreover, even if further knowledge 
is required, it need only be knowledge of conceptual possibilities (what it is for a to be G, say, if a is 
G) – not knowledge of actualities, let alone ones which are constitutively part of a’s being F. Know-
ing how it is that a is F does not entail knowing how the world could be in ways (such as a’s being 
G or b’s being F) that would structurally overlap with a’s being F. (The same is true of the knowl-
edge’s putative belief component. Even if the knowledge of a’s being F involves a belief that a is F, 
it does not thereby involve a belief that a is G or that b is F. At most, beliefs about associated pos-
sibilities are implicated.) 
22
   Your knowledge of each would not rule out a’s being the only instance of F, just as it would not 
rule out F being a’s only property. Would your knowledge therefore be leaving open the possibility 
of the identity between a and F being total, not merely partial? (Is that a possibility?)   142
minimal truthmaker for p – any parts beyond p itself. Can knowledge be like this, 
at least in principle? Seemingly, yes. When I write of some possible knowledge’s 
lacking those further features, I am confident of being understood, if only in a less 
developed way. To at least that extent, therefore, we may coherently distinguish 
between knowledge which is, and knowledge which is not, impressive in these 
further ways.
23 
12  Minimal knowledge as foundational knowledge 
How unimpressive is minimal knowledge? For example, is it mere true belief 
– a true belief bereft of any justificatory support? I am not presuming so.
24 
Hence, I am explicating its minimality or bareness in terms of its object (namely, 
p – and nothing else), rather than in terms of an absence of justificatory support 
for it. I will continue leaving open that question of whether cases of minimal 
knowledge enjoy justificatory support. And in this section I will explicate the 
minimality or bareness of such knowledge along a different dimension, one that 
is compatible with the presence of justification (even if not – as we will soon 
find – of all kinds of justification). I will show how we may understand minimal 
knowledge as a form of foundational knowledge. 
This will involve my offering a slightly non-standard conception of founda-
tional knowledge. As it is standardly defined, foundational knowledge is non-
inferential knowledge. It is knowledge from which (even if only via rational re-
construction) all inferential knowledge ultimately arises. How should we under-
stand inferential knowledge in itself? Typically, epistemologists deem inferential 
knowledge that p – non-foundational knowledge – to be present only if some 
further (and prior) knowledge that q, from which the knowledge that p has 
arisen, is providing sufficient epistemic support for the truth of the belief that p. 
But we may combine that standard picture with this paper’s model of 
knowledge. Because the prior knowledge that q is either actual or implicit evi-
dence for p, it is knowledge of an aspect of how it is that p. (By being evidence 
for p, it is not p itself – that is, p reappearing. It is some other truth, revealing 
part of what is involved in how it is that p.) Accordingly, that evidence might 
well be knowledge of a proper part of a minimal truthmaker for p. In knowing 
that all Gs are Fs, say, one might partly base that knowledge upon knowledge 
that some specified particulars are both G and F. And in knowing that one par-
ticular, a, is F, this could be partly based on knowledge that a is G – where how 
it is that a is F is, in part, a’s being G. 
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   Whether any of our actual knowledge fails to be impressive in those ways is another matter, as is 
the question of whether we would be content with such knowledge. I do not attempt to resolve 
these matters in this paper. 
24
   In (2001), I use the term ‘minimal knowledge’ in that way. But (as note 2 indicated) this paper’s 
account is more general.   143
In such ways, inferential knowledge that p becomes how-knowledge that p; 
and it becomes how-knowledge that p which is more than minimal. It includes 
some developed understanding of how it is that p. It contains partial insight into 
how it is that p. It is somewhat illuminating as to how it is that p. In short, infer-
ential knowledge possesses these features that we usually want in our knowledge 
that p – features that (as section 11 explained) bare or minimal knowledge distinc-
tively lacks. Inferential knowledge that p is (in section 9’s sense) more developed 
knowledge of how it is that p. It is a higher degree of knowledge that p. In that 
way, it is better knowledge that p. 
In contrast, non-inferential knowledge is minimal or bare knowledge. That 
makes it perfect for playing the role of foundational knowledge. This need not be 
because it is certain or infallible (these properties having often been demanded of 
foundational knowledge). Nor need minimal knowledge’s suitability for being 
foundational knowledge be because it includes only a slight amount of justifica-
tion. I have said nothing about how much justification minimal knowledge in-
cludes. I have shown merely why it is not inferentially justified. Foundational 
knowledge, as characterised in this section, is subject to this constraint: 
A piece of foundational knowledge needs only to be an instance of knowledge 
that p which is not informative (and draws upon no information) about anything 
other than p. 
That is precisely what minimal or bare knowledge that p would be like. It would 
be knowledge – of one unadorned truth, of no other truths. 
Admittedly, ‘normal’ or ‘everyday’ or standard knowledge that p is not like 
that – minimal, bare. In most settings, knowing that p includes knowing (even if, 
at times, only implicitly) more truths than p alone. Normally, you know that p by 
knowing additional aspects of how it is that p. But this is because usual instances 
of knowledge that p are cases of non-foundational knowledge that p. Each is 
knowledge of more about p – further aspects of how it is that p – than the un-
adorned fact that p. In that sense, there is an inferential richness to most cases of 
knowledge. Correlatively, foundational knowledge that p is not our usual knowl-
edge that p. The marked majority of our instances of knowledge are not founda-
tional – which is as it should be. (Maybe none are; I leave this open.) 
What is less familiar is the picture being painted here of the nature (as against 
the extent) of foundational knowledge. I am generalizing the traditional concept of 
a foundationalist structuring of knowledge. On that traditional concept, pieces of 
knowledge located lower in, or at the base of, the structure inferentially support 
pieces of knowledge higher in the structure. But once we accept knowledge-
gradualism, that generic description may include this possibility: 
Knowledge that p could appear in more than one place within a foundationalist 
structuring, so long as different degrees or qualities of knowledge that p are do-
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For example, once minimal knowledge that p is at the base of a particular struc-
turing, improved or better knowledge that p might appear later in that structuring. 
Within a foundationalist structuring as it is traditionally conceived, any such reap-
pearance of knowledge that p is viciously circular (and hence is not permitted, 
insofar as the structuring includes only cases of real justification). Vicious circular-
ity is present because that traditional conception of foundationalist structurings is 
also  absolutist. On that conception, no reoccurrence of knowledge that p can 
involve a different strength of knowledge that p. The traditional conception has to 
say that, whenever two instances of knowledge that p appear within a founda-
tionalist structuring, what is happening is this: 
Knowledge that p simpliciter is inferentially grounding knowledge that p sim-
pliciter – which is mere circularity. 
But gradualism can interpret the reappearance of knowledge that p within the one 
foundationalist structuring along these lines: 
A lesser degree of knowledge that p has been supplemented by knowledge of further 
aspects of how it is that p. The result is a more developed piece of how-knowledge 
that p. This amounts to an improved case of knowledge simpliciter that p. (And there 
is no vicious circularity in that epistemic improvement.) 
Imagine having learnt that p by rote, without understanding anything beyond the 
bare fact that p. This would be foundational – minimal – knowledge that p for 
you.
25 If you proceed to learn more aspects of how it is that p, your minimal 
knowledge that p (involving as narrow a grasp of p as is conceptually possible) 
becomes broader, enriched, thickened. Initially, your minimal knowledge that p 
gives way to all-but-minimal knowledge that p. This includes your having at least 
a shred of understanding of how it is that p. Then slightly better knowledge that p 
arrives, with its slightly improved understanding of how it is that p; and this kind 
of improvement might continue, with each improved piece of knowledge that p 
being grounded partly upon the prior, less developed, piece of knowledge that p. 
Of course, minimal knowledge that p need not ground only improved knowl-
edge that p (in the gradualist way explained just now). It might lead to some more 
or less good knowledge that q (q ≠ p), which gives rise to some more or less good 
knowledge that r (q ≠p ≠ r), and so on. This would be a standard foundationalist 
structuring, with no proposition – p, q, r, and the rest – being known more than 
once within the structuring. Structurings like this have traditionally suggested the 
metaphorical description of foundational knowledge as standing to inferential 
knowledge much as the roots of a tree stand to the rest of the tree. 
But the present section reveals additional potential complexity within the 
metaphor of a tree-structuring. That metaphor can accommodate the new 
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   Traditional foundationalists say that in principle only a limited range of possible contents (such as 
immediately sensory ones) could be foundationally known. Williams (2001) argues strongly against 
restricting possible foundations in that way. Accordingly, I am not doing so.   145
gradualist possibility – of there being cases where foundational knowledge that 
p underwrites a structure incorporating more highly developed knowledge that 
p. Within those cases (we may now say), foundational knowledge that p stands 
to the rest of the tree as the tree qua sapling stands to the comparatively mature 
tree. For in those cases the rest of the tree includes richer knowledge that p, 
along with minimal knowledge that p; and richer knowledge that p amounts to 
being knowledge that p which includes minimal knowledge that p as a proper 
part of it. We may therefore think of this minimal knowledge that p as being at 
the tree’s core, rather than just at its base. The tree not only grows upwards; it 
grows outwards. It thickens. It adds layers. A thinner tree becomes a stronger 
tree. And foundational knowledge that p can be part of an analogous process. It 
might be knowledge that p around which some inferentially complex knowledge 
that p has accumulated – like the rings of a tree. A sapling of knowledge that p 
could give rise to a sturdy tree of knowledge that p. That is the (gradualist) case 
in which foundational knowledge that p has been absorbed within more com-
plex knowledge that p, with further aspects of how it is that p having become 
known. This process would have added to the foundational (bare, minimal) 
knowledge that p, so as to build up a more complex (developed, rich) body of 
knowledge, amounting to improved knowledge that p. A progressively broader 
‘tree trunk’ would have developed, with the sapling having done what healthy 
saplings tend to do: it would have grown upwards and outwards. A foundation-
alist structuring of successively improved instances of knowledge that p would 
have taken shape.
26 
13  Gradualism and scepticism 
But can there be knowledge that p in the first place? Or are sceptics right to 
deny us either all knowledge or some significant kinds of knowledge? If ever 
there are epistemological questions taking us dangerously close to immersion 
within an ancient and seemingly inescapable quagmire, it is those ones. None-
theless, we can make progress here. In this section, I briefly indicate how 
knowledge-gradualism might undermine some sceptical challenges. 
At the heart of any such challenge to your knowing that p is your being ex-
pected to know that some given possibility O does not obtain. If you fail to know 
that not-O, then (according to these sceptics) you fail to know that p. That sort 
of claim by sceptics has attracted much epistemological comment over the past 
thirty or so years.
27 Even so, my present argument does not engage with that 
epistemological literature. I will argue that the sceptics’ demand succumbs to a 
fatal dilemma, one that is apparent only once we adopt knowledge-gradualism. 
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   For more on this idea, with a detailed case study – of G. E. Moore’s famously claimed knowledge of 
his hand and of the external world – see my (2001: 169-78). 
27
   Much of this was sparked by Nozick’s (1981: 197-210) denial of knowledge’s being closed under 
known entailment. Nozick extended a way of thinking begun by Dretske (1970).   146
We begin the dilemma thus: Either O’s not obtaining is part of a minimal 
truthmaker for p, or it is not. We will consider each of these alternatives, in turn. 
Horn1. Suppose that O’s not obtaining is part of a minimal truthmaker for p. 
In that case, sceptics are asking you to know that some particular part – namely, 
not-O – of a minimal truthmaker for p is present. For example, if you are to know 
that there is a frog in front of you, sceptics might expect you to know that there is 
at least some physical object in front of you. But knowledge-gradualism implies 
that, in general, having knowledge that p does not require having a higher degree 
or quality of knowledge that p. There can be lesser knowledge that p. Accord-
ingly, there could be parts of a minimal truthmaker for p that are not known – 
even as p itself is known, even as a minimal truthmaker for p is known. Given 
↔H, p could be known – even quite well – when some aspects of how it is that p 
are nonetheless not known by that same person. 
Presumably, sceptics will object that the further knowledge they ask you to 
have – the knowledge that some physical object is in front of you – is an especially 
significant part of a minimal truthmaker for there being a frog in front of you. Its 
significance is such (sceptics will continue) that, even if some parts of that mini-
mal truthmaker do not need to be known, you do need knowledge that this par-
ticular part of that minimal truthmaker obtains. Maybe you do not need to know 
that this frog is exactly eleven inches, as against exactly ten inches, distant from 
you. But you need to know that something physical is in front of you. 
So say these sceptics; to whom I have the following reply. Your knowing of 
there being something physical in front of you is not required as part of knowing 
that there is a frog there. For example, you might be able to recognise and say, 
wholly reliably, when a frog is, and when it is not, present – without being simi-
larly sensitive to the more general phenomenon of something’s being a physical 
object. This is not to deny its being probable that your knowing of there being a 
frog in front of you would in fact include your knowing that there is a physical 
object there. Is the latter knowledge a required part of your knowing of the frog’s 
presence, though? Would it be present as a matter of conceptual necessity – or 
only most likely, as a matter of fact? 
Knowledge-gradualism is a theory of some forms that knowledge can take. 
Hence, it allows us to deny that there is any conceptual requirement for the fur-
ther knowledge to be present. Gradualism permits us to infer that if you do pos-
sess the further piece of knowledge, then (other things being equal) your knowl-
edge of the frog’s presence is slightly better – more developed, richer – than it 
need have been.
28 In other words, gradualism explains away, in non-sceptical 
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   The traditional sceptical strategy of requiring further knowledge to be present (if the initial knowl-
edge that p is to exist) coheres with the conception of knowledge that p as an end-point, which is 
approached only via these many other pieces of knowledge and which cannot be reached until they 
are traversed. In section 10, that conception was discarded by knowledge-gradualism. And in my 
(2006b), I explain in more detail – independently of having accepted gradualism – why that concep-
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terms, the same aspect of the situation that encourages sceptics to dream – which 
is to say, the possible lack of the further knowledge described by these sceptics.
29 
Horn2. Suppose that O’s not obtaining is not part of a minimal truthmaker for 
p. For example, consider the possibility that you are dreaming that p – without 
such dreaming entailing p’s being false.
30 Truthmaker theory allows us to infer that 
if you are to know that p, you need not know of this possibility’s not obtaining. 
The reason is that your having this extra knowledge is not literally part of your 
knowing that p. Insofar as (via ↔H) knowledge that p just is how-knowledge that 
p, and insofar as (from section 8) how-knowledge that p just is knowledge of some 
lesser or greater number of parts of a minimal truthmaker for p, we derive this 
result: Knowledge that p need not include knowledge of anything that is not part 
of a minimal truthmaker for p. 
Sceptics will resist that inference. They will regard it (on the following 
grounds) as reflecting a needlessly narrow interpretation of what it is to know: 
Some possibilities do not describe situations inconsistent with p’s truth. Nevertheless, 
they can be centrepieces of sceptical challenges to knowledge that p. Thus, O’s entail-
ing not-p is not necessary to its helping to deprive one of knowledge that p. Even if 
your dreaming that p could coexist with the truth of your belief that p, your belief 
would – if formed via dreaming – be coming into existence inconsistently with its be-
ing knowledge that p. It would be unjustified, say.
31 
That is a standard sceptical manoeuvre. However, as Heil (1990) has demon-
strated, even that sceptical reasoning would not entail your needing to know of 
your not dreaming. It entails at most your needing not to be dreaming.
32 And the 
equivalence (via ↔H) of knowledge that p with how-knowledge that p supple-
ments Heil’s reasoning. Insofar as knowledge of not-O – such as knowledge of 
one’s not dreaming that p – is not knowledge of part of a minimal truthmaker for 
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   Sceptics might try ‘shrinking’ the sceptical possibility, O, so that to know of its not obtaining is 
ipso facto to know that p. (For instance, instead of asking you to know that there is some physical 
object in front of you, they might require you to know that you are not mistaking a physical object 
for something other than a frog.) In that case, however, sceptics cannot be advancing the possibil-
ity as something further or independent which, if you are to know that p, you need to know is not 
obtaining. Why is that? To the extent that there is ‘shrinking’, the sceptics’ possibility is a descrip-
tion merely of p’s not obtaining; in which case, these sceptics cannot be asking you to know of the 
possibility’s not obtaining – with this knowledge being further knowledge you need if you are to 
know that p. For more on this problem confronting some would-be sceptical challenges, see my 
(2001: 37-40; 2002: 95-7; 2004). 
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   Its not entailing not-p is how Stroud (1984: ch. 1) envisages the Cartesian dreaming possibility. For 
Descartes himself, his dreaming possibility in ‘Meditation I’ did include his being deceived as to the 
truth of whichever belief of his was in question. See Haldane and Ross (1911: 145-6). 
31
   This sceptic’s point may be stated in terms of defeaters. A defeater can, as Pollock (1986: 38-9) 
says, either undercut or rebut. Horn1 concerned O qua rebutting defeater – a possibility bearing 
upon the truth of the particular belief that p. Horn2’s focus is on O qua undercutting defeater – a 
possibility bearing upon there being good justification for that belief. 
32
   No one disputes that there can be related benefits in knowing that one is not dreaming. But it is 
not obligatory, as a potential knower of p, to do whatever is necessary to obtain those possible 
benefits – extrinsic as they are to the knowing as such that p. It is obligatory only when one’s goal 
is to have knowledge that p with those extra benefits.   148
p, it is literally not knowledge of part of how it is that p. So, these sceptics are 
requiring you to ‘expand’ or develop the knowledge that p into knowledge of more 
than p – even of more than how it is that p. In particular, it could well be knowl-
edge of how it is known that p. And it is not thereby knowledge of how it is that 
p. Hence, by ↔H, it is not knowledge that p. 
Conclusion. From the conjunction of Horn1 and Horn2, sceptics are mistaken 
when deeming your knowing that not-O to be a necessary condition of your 
knowing that p. Some standard sceptical challenges to the existence of knowledge 
thus fail. 
14  How not to argue for knowledge-absolutism 
Previous sections have provided some evidence of how epistemologically ad-
vantageous it could be to adopt knowledge-gradualism. Why, then, have episte-
mologists so unhesitatingly accepted knowledge-absolutism?
33 Based on frag-
ments of arguments I have encountered, here is what seems to be the strongest 
form of defence underlying the standard assumption of knowledge-absolutism: 
(1) Once p is known, there is nothing more – and nothing less – of it to be known by 
the same person in the same epistemic setting. To know that p is to know the truth of 
the proposition p; and you cannot alter, even slightly, the object of that knowledge 
without wholly deleting the knowledge that p. (Either you lose knowledge altogether, 
or you replace knowledge that p with knowledge that q, where q ≠ p.) Knowing that p 
is an all-or-nothing state of affairs. If any different component of the knowledge that p 
(such as the justification) is altered, even by being improved, again that particular 
piece of knowledge that p is no more. At best, you gain a new instance of knowledge 
that p. (2) Contrast knowing that p with knowing a person, say. There can be better or 
worse knowledge of a person – because that kind of object of knowledge has more or 
less of itself being known at a given time. If more of, or about, the person becomes 
known, this is not a new instance of knowing that person. The on-going knowledge of 
the person simply improves. (3) From (1) and (2), although knowledge that p cannot be 
improved (with more of p becoming known within one piece of knowledge that p), 
knowledge of a person can be improved (with more of the person becoming known 
within one instance of knowing him or her). 
But that reasoning overlooks knowledge that p’s being how-knowledge that 
p. Given ↔H, knowledge that p can – contrary to what (1) claimed – be knowl-
edge of more than simply the proposition p. Indeed (depending upon how wide-
spread minimal knowledge actually is), knowledge that p is almost always knowl-
edge of more besides. It generally includes knowledge of further aspects of how it 
is that p – aspects beyond p as such, most narrowly construed. On such occa-
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   Is it (as Bill Lycan suggested to me) that at least some epistemologists might be relying upon a 
shallow grammatical point – namely, the inability of the term ‘knowing’ to admit of comparatives? 
No one can be said to be knowinger than another in some respect. True; but further explanation is 
needed. No one can be said, either, to be knowinger than another in some practical respect – an 
ability. Yet epistemologists routinely agree that knowing-how can be gradational. (Section 15 will 
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sions, to know that p is to know more than p, to some extent or other. It is to 
know truths, for instance, other than p – even as part of knowing that p. For it is 
to know some more or less extensive array of aspects of how it is that p.
34 (Truth-
maker theory reinforces that point. We see that knowledge of parts of a minimal 
truthmaker for p can be knowledge that p. And in accord with how many of those 
parts are being known, there is some correlative degree or quality of knowledge 
that p. Even if not all parts of a minimal truthmaker for p are themselves truth-
makers for p, they can be minimal truthmakers for a q such that q is an aspect of 
how it is that p; and in knowing that p, aspects of how it is that p are what one 
knows.) 
15  Linguistic evidence 
The (proto-)theory of knowledge being developed here is not intended to 
stand or fall wholly in response to linguistic evidence. (Unlike contextualism, it is 
not primarily a theory of knowledge-attributions as such.) Nor has the argument 
proceeded by repeatedly consulting ‘linguistic intuitions’. Other things being 
equal, though, it would be preferable for the finished theory to cohere with how 
the word ‘know’ and its cognates are generally used. Not only would this supply 
further defeasible and fallible evidence in favour of the theory (at least as a theory 
of ‘our shared ordinary concept of knowledge’); it would facilitate corresponding 
systemic and theoretical improvements in future ordinary linguistic uses (possibly 
even modifying ‘our shared ordinary concept of knowledge’). 
And the theory does have some such links with ordinary language. Let us at-
tend to an observation by Douven (2004: 323 n.15). In the midst of an extended 
critical analysis of contextualism’s ability to model various comparative and super-
lative linguistic constructions involving ‘know’, he notes that the phrases ‘know-
ing more’ and ‘knowing most’ are ‘indisputably part of everyday discourse’, while 
the phrases ‘knowing better’ and ‘knowing best’ ‘may be somewhat less natural’.
35 
Here is how my theory respects those remarks. 
(1) My key conceptual move has been to introduce the concept of how-
knowledge that p – arguing for knowledge that p’s being how-knowledge that p. 
And the latter is gradational. How-knowledge that p is knowledge of how it is that 
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   When does knowing further truths related to p (truths helping to constitute how it is that p) 
amount, instead, to knowing some q other than p? If I know that p poorly today and better tomor-
row, I do so by knowing more tomorrow that helps to constitute how it is that p. Do I thereby know 
a different truth tomorrow from what I know today? Other things being equal, I do know a new 
conjunction of constitutive truths. (I use that description for simplicity. Recall note 16’s leaving 
open the possibility of not all how-knowledge’s being only of truths.) How does the new conjunc-
tion manage to be knowledge of p – in that respect being like my knowledge today that p, which is 
nonetheless knowledge of a different conjunction of constitutive truths? The answer might emerge 
from a point made briefly in section 8, paragraph (iii). Within each case (respectively, today’s and 
tomorrow’s knowledge, each being ostensibly of p), there will be some knowledge of how those 
various other truths are helping to constitute p. 
35
   Importantly, Douven includes, within the intended scope of his analysis, people’s uses of those 
phrases for talking about knowledge that p.   150
p. To have such knowledge is, ipso facto, to have some degree of knowledge of 
how it is that p. Or (in the comparative mode) it is to know more, or it is to know 
less, of how it is that p. Accordingly, some of the linguistic representations it 
renders applicable constitute a special case of the ‘knowing more’ (or, equally, 
‘knowing less’) construction which, Douven allows, is clearly an element in ordi-
nary language. He is correct in that assessment. It is natural to speak of knowing 
more, or knowing less, of what is involved in a friend’s being ill, for example: ‘I 
know that she’s ill, although I don’t know much about it. I don’t know many de-
tails.’ At its core, my theory coheres well with this aspect of ordinary speech. 
(2) Then my theory conjoins the gradational dimension described in (1) with 
an epistemically qualitative assessment: One’s knowing more, or knowing less, of 
how it is that p amounts to one’s knowing that p more or less well. Because, by 
(1), to know that p is to know more or less extensively or fully how it is that p, it is 
to know that p more or less extensively or fully. This, I have urged, is to know that 
p more or less well. And this construction has the flexibility to cover both preci-
sion and vagueness in how we speak and think about knowledge. Precision: It 
allows us to say how well we know that p, perhaps having in mind a specific and 
good epistemic standard. (‘I know that p. Actually, I know it well – certainly better 
than I might have done, and better than I did two days ago.’) Vagueness: It allows 
us to acknowledge epistemic indeterminacy: ‘I know that p more or less well – 
roughly, somewhat well. I can’t be more specific than that as to how well I know 
it’ (possibly with this admitted vagueness reflecting one’s not having in mind any 
more specific epistemic standard). 
Suppose we agree with Douven that people do not often mention how well 
they know that p; generally, they talk just of knowing, or not knowing, that p. 
Even so, this does not entail that they never refer to knowledge qualitatively or 
gradationally. Nor does it entail that such a way of speaking about knowledge 
either could or should not ordinarily be used. For a start, that formulation some-
times appears within natural language. (‘I know very well that p.’ ‘As you well 
know, p.’ ‘Unfortunately, I only have poor knowledge of that circumstance.’ And 
on it goes.) Admittedly, it is not what people tend to reach for most readily when 
casually and unreflectively discussing knowledge. It occurs less frequently, usually 
indicating accompanying thoughtfulness of a kind that results in an acknowl-
edgement of either precision or vagueness (as these were gestured at in the previ-
ous paragraph). And that thoughtfulness is often absent when people claim or 
attribute knowledge. Vagueness: They will not always realise that they know only 
more or less well that p. (Nor might they wish to admit it, when they are aware of 
it.) Precision: They might not be either able or motivated to ascertain precisely 
how well they know that p. Simply knowing that p – however well this is done – 
will be enough for their perceived purposes. Their discourse will reflect this. It is 
thereby a simplifying discourse. 
By the same token, my theory is not undermined by the fact that ‘knows well 
that p’, say, is used much less frequently than the simpler ‘knows that p’. From 
(1): My introduction of the concept of how-knowledge that p is theoretically and   151
linguistically apt. From (2): That concept is impliedly a non-absolutist concept of 
knowledge that p. Hence, the latter concept could be absorbed effortlessly into 
ordinary speech. This would be linguistically apt. It would be theoretically apt, 
too. Given ↔H and dK, ordinary language’s tendency to speak just of knowing 
that p, rather than of having a more specific degree of knowledge that p, or of 
knowing more or less well that p, is at best a conceptual simplification. As I have 
conceded, maybe distractions within everyday situations encourage the continued 
use of that form of simplification. But this is not a good reason for epistemological 
conversations to be inattentive to degrees of knowledge and to knowledge’s non-
absolutist dimension. In epistemological settings, we seek to understand some 
aspects of knowledge which ordinary settings need not even notice, let alone 
habitually acknowledge. We must therefore be open to the possibility of talking 
about knowledge in not-obviously-ordinary ways. What we can ask of an episte-
mologist who does this, however, is that she find an apparent link between overtly 
epistemological discussions of knowledge and clearly everyday references to it. 
That is what ↔H and dK supply. They show – via the bridging concept of how-
knowledge – that something which is linguistically everyday (‘knows that’) is 
equivalent, at a deeper level of explication, to a disjunction of instances of some-
thing that is not linguistically everyday (the instances being ‘knows well that’, 
‘knows less well that’, and so on). 
That transformation does not entail that ‘ordinary’ talk of knowledge is not or-
dinary after all (because it is ‘implicitly’ theoretical). It shows how ordinary talk of 
knowledge could become less ordinary – rather than being merely supplanted 
(whenever epistemology is being spoken) by less ordinary talk of knowledge. We 
also find systemic benefits in adding a non-absolutist dimension to our concept of 
knowledge, at least so that epistemological discourse becomes more explanatorily 
powerful. Semantic or pragmatic considerations would not always require us to 
recognise that non-absolutist dimension in our claims or attributions of knowl-
edge. Nevertheless, it remains conceptually available – which is especially useful 
in some of epistemology’s more technical debates. This is why I have mentioned 
(to take but two examples) its potential for assisting attempts to understand foun-
dationalism or to withstand sceptical challenges. If we bring this enhanced con-
ceptual framework to bear upon such problems, there is a prospect of making 
epistemological progress by enriching the conceptual resources that have tradi-
tionally been applied to such problems. We would add to our epistemological 
understanding of knowledge by noticing the gradualist dimension within our con-
cept of knowledge. If we move somewhat beyond ordinary language in doing this, 
we should not be perturbed. Epistemology is already beyond ordinary language, at 
least in its more systemic moments – and despite occasional epistemological prot-
estations to the contrary.
36 
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   Chuck Cross, Anne Newstead, and an audience at the 2005 Australasian Association of Philosophy 
Conference gave me very helpful comments on different drafts of this paper.   152
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